John Taylor, Professor of Economics at Stanford University and developer of the "Taylor Rule" for setting interest rates | Stanford University
John Taylor, Professor of Economics at Stanford University and developer of the "Taylor Rule" for setting interest rates | Stanford University
Jonathan Bendor, a professor of political economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, emphasizes the need for accountability in democracies, even when dealing with highly trained experts. In a recent paper published in the American Political Science Review, co-authored with Piotr Swistak from the University of Maryland at College Park, Bendor argues that while expertise and meritocracy are essential, they must be balanced with oversight by non-experts.
Bendor highlights the importance of not blindly deferring to experts. "Some people mistakenly think that what is most consistent with meritocracy is to have a hierarchy, and the person at the top isn’t accountable to anybody," he says. "We think this is a huge error."
The tension between experts and non-experts is inherent in modern societies and organizations. Experts are necessary for smooth operations, but accountability remains crucial. "The combination of these two processes — knowledge-intensive [decision-making] and everyone being accountable to somebody — creates an important tension or problem of its own: nonspecialists need to hold people accountable," Bendor explains.
This dynamic can be observed in various sectors such as infrastructure, economics, and foreign policy where officials without technical expertise oversee professionals. This balance becomes particularly significant when addressing complex issues like climate change.
Historical examples underscore this point. Imperial Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II was a bureaucratic meritocracy but ultimately failed due to lack of accountability at the top. Similarly, the ancient Roman triumvirate showed how leaders could become oligarchs if not properly checked.
Bendor and Swistak argue that democracy provides the best solution to this tension by allowing voters to review and judge experts. They contend that democratic elections combined with meritocratic hierarchies create an effective system. "Democracies need bureaucracies to get things done, and they are done better if agencies are meritocratic," they write.
Addressing concerns about uninformed voters holding elected officials accountable, Bendor points out that even experts have significant knowledge gaps. He suggests accepting this as a feature of modern systems rather than a flaw.
In discussing climate change, Bendor stresses that decision-makers who are not climate scientists must determine whom to trust based on meritocratic principles. He notes that fields with ample data provide clear metrics for success or failure.
Ultimately, Bendor advocates for elevating oversight over specialized knowledge within democracies. He believes this approach will lead to optimal solutions without sacrificing crucial expertise. "I believe that the best solution is a system that works hard to be as meritocratic as possible," he concludes.